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ABSTRACT
Though it has often been quipped that the September 11th attacks changed “everything”,
domestic policy alterations were among the most significant changes after 9/11. Specifically, the
2002 Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines and the 2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines
were two of the most impactful policy changes following 9/11. These Attorney General
Guidelines changed the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated terrorism in
the United States in addition to making counterterrorism the FBI’s top priority. One of the ways
the FBI prevents terrorism is through the use of undercover agents and confidential informants.
How the 2002 and 2008 Attorney General Guidelines influenced the FBI’s use of human
intelligence in terrorism investigations has remained to be seen. This study reviews the historical
policy changes following 9/11 and examines their influence on the FBI’s use of undercover
operatives in terrorism cases. While I found that the percentage of terrorism investigations that
used undercover operatives dropped by over 40% after the Ashcroft Guidelines were
implemented, I also found that investigations that used undercover operatives were more
successful in preventing terrorism incidents compared to terrorism investigations that did not use
undercover operatives. Thus, policy makers should use caution when amending guidelines to
terrorism investigations and perhaps a lot more resources to undercover operations.
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HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL TERRORISM CASES
I. Introduction
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took the lives of nearly 3,000 people in New
York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania. During the aftermath of those attacks, the media and
the public looked for someone to blame. Among those who received blame, the intelligence
community faced some of the heaviest criticism. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks,
policymakers amended guidelines upon which the intelligence community operated. The changes
in guidelines were intended to help law enforcement and intelligence analysts prevent future
terrorist attacks like those that occurred on September 11th, from happening again.
The intelligence community in the United States encompasses sixteen different agencies
and offices, each handled by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Kaplan, 2012).
Within these sixteen agencies are six program managers who are responsible for gathering and
examining various types of intelligence information (Kaplan, 2012). Amid these program
manager agencies is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a member of the intelligence
community, the FBI is responsible for warning policymakers of potential threats to the nation’s
security (Schalch, 2003). Moreover, the FBI is the lead authority in investigating terrorism in the
United States. In order to warn policymakers of potential threats, the FBI obtains and examines
intelligence information gathered via human intelligence, also known as confidential informants
and undercover agents. The procedures governing the FBI’s domestic investigative operations
are known as the Attorney General Guidelines. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, there
have been two changes in these guidelines: the 2002 John Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines,
and the 2008 Michael Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines. The Ashcroft Guidelines expanded
the FBI’s investigative procedures and revived the agency’s domestic intelligence role. Six years
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later, the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines again bolstered the FBI’s investigative abilities by imposing
fewer restrictions (Shields, 2012).
Changes to the guidelines over the past decade have not only increased the FBI’s power,
but they also changed its ability to use confidential informants and undercover agents. Few
empirical studies have analyzed the FBI’s use of confidential informants and undercover agents
in domestic terrorism incidents. Of those that have, there have been several key findings. First, it
is known that just over 40% of domestic terrorism cases use human intelligence (Greenberg,
2011). Second, there was nearly a 40% drop in the use of informants and over a 25% drop in the
use of undercover agents in the immediate years following 9/11 (Shields, 2012). Finally,
confidential informants and undercover agents represent some of the most successful tactics in
detecting terrorist plots and in identifying and apprehending perpetrators in completed terrorist
attacks (Hewitt, 2014). Thus, limited research on human intelligence in terrorism cases has
shown the significance of undercover operatives.
To better understand changes in the use of human intelligence in terrorism investigations,
Structural Contextual Theory will be applied to an analysis of terrorism data before and after the
9/11 attacks. Structural Contextual Theory suggests that components of the justice system
normally work rather autonomously of one another, but also that in some political environments
of the criminal justice operations come together to collectively target a specific type of crime and
criminal for the purposes of prosecution (Hagan, 1989). In the past, Structural Contextual Theory
has been used to help explain responses to terrorism in terms of sentencing outcomes. Smith and
Damphousse (1998) hypothesized that if terrorism caught the public’s attention the justice
system would work together to target terrorist actors using the justice system. Collaboration
throughout the justice system would then limit discretion among prosecuting and sentencing
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terrorists. Thus, the more seriously terrorism is viewed by the public, the less difference there
should be in sentencing outcomes in terrorism cases. Smith and Damphousse (1998) found
nearly four times more explained variance in sentence outcomes for terrorists than nonterrorists,
supporting structural contextual theory. Using Structural Contextual Theory, this paper will
examine the use of confidential informants and undercover agents post-9/11 to address two
research questions. The first research question asks how the Ashcroft and Mukasey Guidelines
changed the use of confidential informants and undercover agents used in terrorism cases. The
second research question asks what impact, if any, the changes in the use of undercover agents
and confidential informants have had on case processing and outcomes in terrorism cases.
As mentioned previously, there is a shortcoming in empirical research on the use of
confidential informants and undercover agents in domestic terrorism cases. In particular, prior
literature has yet to examine the use of human intelligence in the last several years (Shields,
2012; Greenberg, 2011). Additionally, the most recent study involving human intelligence did
not examine the nature of terrorism case outcomes in cases with informants and undercover
agents (see Hewitt, 2014). My study builds directly on Shields (2012), as well as Greenberg
(2011) and Hewitt (2014), by extending the time frame of analyzing human intelligence to 2014
and by examining how the use of confidential informants and undercover agents varies across
category of terrorism, intended target type, and conviction rate in cases with human intelligence
(compared to cases without human intelligence among other factors).
Examining confidential informants and undercover agents through this study will add to
existing literature while also being socially relevant. After 9/11 the FBI was criticized for not
connecting the dots concerning information they possessed that potentially could have prevented
the attacks from that day. One criticism was that the FBI was too reactive and suffered from
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structural weaknesses (Zegart, 2007). FBI agents were trained to be reactive, case driven, and
conviction oriented- to investigate past crimes and not to prevent future ones (Zegart, 2007). In
response to this criticism, Attorney General John Ashcroft changed the FBI from a reactive
agency to a proactive agency with his 2002 Attorney General Guidelines by bolstering
investigative procedures. While Ashcroft changed the structure of the FBI into a proactive
agency, recent criticism has suggested that the FBI is being too proactive, especially through
sting operations using confidential informants and undercover agents. One example was
showcased in the 2014 HBO documentary The Newburgh Sting, which depicts a 2009 terrorism
plot where four men were allegedly coaxed by an FBI informant to attack U.S. military planes in
New York. Findings from the current study may be relevant for homeland security policy, as the
entrapment of defendants and other socially relevant human rights issues have arisen from cases
involving human intelligence.
This study is set up as follows. First, I provide a historical account of policy changes and
their impact on federal terrorism investigations. Second, I review extant literature on confidential
informants and undercover agents. Third, I lay out research questions followed by a discussion of
research methods and specific hypotheses. Fifth, I present the results from my analyses and,
finally, I end with a discussion of my findings and their implications for policy and future
research.
II. Policy Change and Terrorism Investigations
Background
Terrorism is not a new social problem, but has occurred in its various forms over the
course of history in most every corner of the world (Mahan & Griset, 2013). In the United States,
two monumental events changed America’s understanding of modern American terrorism. The
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first terrorism event was bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City by
far-right extremists Timothy McVeigh and his accomplices in 1995 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).
The bombing awakened America to the threat of homegrown, anti-government terrorism. The
second event was of course the 9/11 hijackings and suicide attacks in New York City,
Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania by Al Qaeda. The culmination of these attacks demonstrated
the threat of international terrorism to the country and ushered in vast changes to federal antiterrorism policies. Since the 9/11 terrorism attacks, several other smaller-scale terrorism attacks
(e.g., Boston Marathon bombings), thwarted plots, and revisions to anti-terrorism laws have
shaped the practices of law enforcement agencies.
The FBI was understandably most affected by these changes given its primary
responsibility to counter terrorism in the United States. While government and intelligence
agencies may define terrorism differently (Schmid, 2004; Schmid & Jongman, 1988), the FBI
defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance
of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2009, p.ii). In addition to maintaining a clear definition of
terrorism, the FBI adheres to a set of procedures known as the “Attorney General’s Guidelines
on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations”
that dictate the circumstances in which terrorism investigations can be initiated. The Attorney
General Guidelines have evolved over the last several decades by the Department of Justice and
in response to social criticism and the changing landscape of social and political violence in the
United States.
Attorney General Edward Levi created the first Attorney General Guidelines in 1976.
The guidelines were developed in part as a response to the Watergate scandal and the free speech
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and privacy violations uncovered during the Nixon Administration. The purpose of the stricter
guidelines was to impose new standards by which “domestic security investigations” could be
initiated (FBI Statutory Charter, 1978). The proactive domestic intelligence gathering
capabilities of the FBI were curbed and domestic terrorism cases were opened based strictly on
the predicate of known criminal activity.
While the Levi guidelines were created to restrict the FBI’s investigative authority, a
series of attacks by left-wing terrorists would lead the government to reconsider such changes
(Smith, 1994). In response to these attacks, Attorney General William Smith issued a new set of
guidelines in 1983 that gave FBI field offices around the nation greater flexibility in the
investigative process (Smith, 1994). The FBI, however, continued to avoid opening
investigations of individual terrorists and relied on the establishment of criminal predicate before
opening counterterrorism investigations throughout the 1980s.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission Report revealed that a number of
opportunities for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to intercept the deadly plot against
the United States were missed (9/11 Commission, 2004; see also Zegart, 2007). The Report also
publicly unveiled how organizational “red tape” designed to check the FBI’s authority to
investigate terrorism in the United States might have inadvertently led to missed opportunities
for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to “connect the dots.”
In response to the 9/11 hijackings, the primary mission of the FBI was changed to
preventing the next terrorist attack (Mueller, 2003). In other words, the FBI essentially overnight
transitioned back into a proactive domestic intelligence-gathering agency. Attorney General John
Ashcroft created a new set of guidelines (“Ashcroft Guidelines”) that included allowances for
longer investigation periods, centralizing fieldwork analysis at FBI headquarters, and eliminating
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the need to gain permission from FBI Headquarters to open investigations (Office of the
Attorney General, 2002a; Shields, 2012).
While the Ashcroft guidelines were being formed in late 2001, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act strengthened the FBI’s investigative authority in terms of
surveillance and wiretapping. Additionally, the PATRIOT Act loosened standards for obtaining
warrants and issuing subpoenas in investigative matters (Jones, 2009). After creation of the
PATRIOT Act there would be no significant policy changes until the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines
were issued which further enhanced the FBI’s power to investigate cases. In addition to outlining
the purposes and procedures for three types of investigations (discussed more below), the
Mukasey Guidelines permitted these investigations on either the violation of federal statutes or
“threats to national security” (Jones, 2009).
While the Ashcroft Guidelines were the first significant changes to the Attorney General
Guidelines since 1983, they are especially significant to this study because of changes to the
Confidential Informant Guidelines (Office of the Attorney General, 2002b) and Undercover
Operations Guidelines (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c). Both of these guidelines provide
detailed rules regarding the use of confidential informants and undercover agents. A 2005 OIG
special report reviewing the Confidential Informant Guidelines noted that FBI personnel ranging
from new agents to the Director stated that the paperwork associated with opening and operating
informants was excessive, burdensome, and time-consuming. The report also noted that some
FBI agents had become reluctant to use informants because of these and other administrative and
operational burdens (Office of the Inspector General, 2005).
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III. Policy Changes
The events of 9/11 significantly influenced counterterrorism policy. The 9/11
Commission scrutinized the FBI for being rooted in law enforcement and not equipped to
accomplish intelligence assignments (Shields et al, 2009). Changes in policy after these attacks
substantially altered the way the federal government investigated and prosecuted those
individuals suspected to be involved in terrorism (Shields et al, 2009). Prior to the specific 2002
policy changes regarding confidential informants and undercover agents and the general changes
to the FBI’s investigation of terrorism, domestic antiterrorism policy focused on infiltrating and
“beheading” terrorist organizations (Shields et al, 2009). After the 2002 policy changes, the
FBI’s focus as mandated by Attorney General Ashcroft was to intervene early and investigate
aggressively. Ashcrofti stated that, “our philosophy today is not to wait and sift through the
rubble following a terrorist attack. Rather, the FBI must intervene early and investigate
aggressively where information exists suggesting the possibility of terrorism, so as to prevent
acts of terrorism”. The 2002 Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines, the USA Patriot Act, and the
2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines altered the FBI’s approach to combating terrorism.
The most dramatic of all the post 9/11 policy changes, though, were the Ashcroft Guidelines.
These guidelines swiftly and singlehandedly transitioned the FBI from being a proactive agency
to a reactive agency.
Ashcroft Guidelines
On May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the first Attorney General’s
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations
after 9/11. At the time these were issued, Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that
the revised guidelines were necessary to abolish departmental barriers limiting field agents and
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their superiors to handle terrorist threats, while simultaneously directing day-to-day activities of
federal law enforcement departments within legal and constitutional boundaries (Office of the
Attorney General, 2005). The 2002 guidelines authorized several new tools for the FBI. The first
was the authority to start specific types of investigations with fewer evidentiary thresholds and
without approval from FBI Headquarters (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). Previously, the
Smith guidelines required FBI Headquarters to approve all terrorism investigations before
initiation, and the director was to supervise the investigation in 180-day intervals (Ellif, 1984;
Shields et al, 2009). The new Ashcroft Guidelines provided FBI field offices with the authority
to commence investigations unilaterally, and allowed those investigations to proceed up to a year
before reporting them to FBI Headquarters (Shields et al, 2009). Second, the Ashcroft Guidelines
extended authority to the FBI to use undercover techniques in criminal intelligence investigations
(racketeering enterprise and terrorism enterprise investigations) that were previously only
allowed in general crimes investigations (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). The guidelines
stated that, “In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be
used” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002, pp. 14-17). A third authorization involved public
places and events. The guidelines maintained that, “for the purpose of detecting or preventing
terrorist activities, the FBI is authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the
public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally” (Office of the
Attorney General, 2002, p. 22). Lastly, the guidelines allowed the FBI to conduct online
searches, and access online forums and sites, just as the public may for purposes of preventing or
detecting terrorism or other criminal activities (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). In a
speech addressing the revisions to the guidelines, Ashcroftii suggested up that a key objective for
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the FBI was to prevent terrorism by intervening early and investigating aggressively.
Confidential Informant Guidelines
The Confidential Informant Guidelines define confidential informant as, “any individual
who provides useful and credible information to a Department of Justice Law Enforcement
Agency (JLEA) regarding felonious criminal activities, and from whom the JLEA expects or
intends to obtain useful and credible information regarding such activities in the future” (Office
of the Attorney General, 2002, p.2). The 2002 Ashcroft guidelines contained three minor
revisions to the Confidential Informant Guidelines. The first change involved the verbatim
reading of instructions to informants. Under previous guidelines, agents working with
confidential informants were required to read, verbatim, specific instructions concerning the
boundaries set on the CIs’ activities (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The 2002 revision
to this rule removed the verbatim reading requirement, stating that, “at least one agent of the
JLEA, along with one additional agent or other law enforcement official present as a witness,
shall review with the CI written instructions” (Office of Attorney General, 2002, p. 11). FBI
Director Robert Mueller deemed this change necessary because, “the verbatim instructions,
written in often intimidating legalese, were proving to have a chilling effect, causing confidential
informants to leave the program” (Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, 2003, p. 89).
The second alteration to the CI Guidelines permitted agents to adapt the instructions –
including instructions that safeguard the confidentiality of the informant’s identity – to the
informant’s distinct situation (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The final modification to
the informant guidelines involved promising immunity from prosecution. Prior guidelines
required agents handling CIs to instruct them that investigative agencies could not promise
immunity from prosecution (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The 2002 Guidelines
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adamantly clarified agents’ roles stating that, “whether or not this instruction is given to a CI, the
JLEA does not have any authority to make any promise or commitment that would prevent the
government from prosecuting an individual…and a JLEA agent must avoid giving any person
the erroneous impression that he or she has such authority” (Office of the Attorney General,
2002, p.12).
Undercover Operations Guidelines
The Undercover Operations Guidelines defines an undercover employee as, “any
employee of the FBI, or employee of a Federal, or local law enforcement agency working under
the direction and control of the FBI in a particular investigation, whose relationship with the FBI
is concealed from third parties in the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a
cover or alias identity” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, p.1). The 2002 Ashcroft
Guidelines also provided four major counterterrorism-related revisions to the Undercover
Operations Guidelines. The first change simply placed an emphasis on terrorism prevention as a
legitimate goal of undercover operations (Office of the Attorney General, 2005). The 2002
guidelines stated that, “The use of undercover techniques…is essential to the detection,
prevention, and prosecution… of terrorism” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, p.1).
The second amendment to the guidelines made explicit and emphasized the FBI’s
authority to use undercover techniques towards its criminal intelligence investigations goals
(Office of the Attorney General, 2002c). The guidelines stated that, “In criminal intelligence
investigations – i.e., racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism enterprise investigations
– these methods may be used to further the investigative objective… of detection, prevention,
and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise” (Office of the Attorney General,
2002c, p.2).
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The third alteration to the UCO Guidelines gave Special Agents in Charge (SAC) more
authority to initiate undercover operations. The guidelines stated that, “the SAC may approve an
undercover operation when…the initiation, extension, or renewal of an operation is necessary to
avoid the loss of a significant investigative opportunity” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c,
p.15). The fourth and final revision to the UCO Guidelines added one additional factor that
SAC’s must take into account before approving an operation. The additional factor was, “[t]he
risk of invasion of privacy or interference with privileged or confidential relationships and any
potential constitutional concerns or other legal concerns” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c,
p.3). In sum, the 2002 revisions of the UCO Guidelines overall gave the FBI more authority to
utilize undercover operations in terrorism investigations.
USA PATRIOT Act
Like the Attorney General Guidelines, the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act by
Congress in 2001 significantly enhanced law enforcement’s investigative abilities. Among new
powers the PATRIOT Act gave to the FBI was the capability to obtain a warrant and conduct
investigations and surveillance without first notifying the individual, in addition to delaying
notification given proper conditions (Jones, 2009). As stated in Section 213 of the Act, providing
immediate notification could be delayed if the court found reasonable cause that execution of the
warrant may have an adverse result (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Furthermore, the PATRIOT
Act allowed the government to issue a subpoena and acquire information from targets without
conferring with a court of law (Jones, 2009). Significantly, the PATRIOT Act stated that, “
‘foreign intelligence information’ means information that relates to the national defense or the
security of the United States” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). These semantics relaxed boundaries
of the procedure and scope of intelligence operations (Jones, 2009). This permitted the FBI to
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administer FISA in any way the agency believes applies to the context of national security
(Jones, 2009). Other noteworthy changes resulting from the PATRIOT Act included enhanced
surveillance procedures resulting in new pen register and trap and trace devices. This provided
the government more authority to monitor telephone numbers received and called from specific
telephone lines.
Mukasey Guidelines
On December 1, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey further modified the Attorney
General Guidelines for terrorism investigations by consolidating FBI investigative guidelines
under a single rubric. The issuance of the 2008 guidelines represented the pinnacle of the
evolution of the FBI towards an intelligence agency rather than strictly being a law enforcement
organization. More specifically, these guidelines outlined three types of terrorism investigations,
including Assessments, Predicated Investigations, and Enterprise Investigations.
Assessment investigations are to be used for the purpose of detecting, obtaining
information about, or preventing or protecting against threats to national security or federal
crimes (Mukasey, 2008). More specifically, they are to be used to detect and interrupt criminal
activities at their early stages (Mukasey, 2008). Regarding authorization, assessments do not
require any specific factual predication, only an “authorized purpose” and do not warrant
approval by supervisors (Shields et al, 2009).
Predicated Investigations are more restricted than assessments in that they require
approval from a Special Agent in Charge or by an FBI Headquarters official (Mukasey, 2008).
Additionally, predicated investigations require predication – “allegations, reports, facts or
circumstances indicative of possible criminal or national security threatening activity” (Mukasey,
2008, p.18). Predicated investigations are partitioned between preliminary investigations and full
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investigations. Preliminary investigations can be commenced on any information or allegation
indicative of possible national security or criminal threatening activity whereas full
investigations require a more factual predication (Mukasey, 2008). Conversely, full
investigations have no time limit, whereas preliminary investigations terminate after six months
unless a SAC approves a six-month extension or FBI Headquarters approves an extension greater
than one year (Mukasey, 2008).
The final type of investigation approved in the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines is the
Enterprise Investigation. Enterprise investigations are a form of full investigations, which
generally examine the structure, scope, and nature of specific groups and organizations
(Mukasey, 2008). While enterprise investigations require a factual predication, they are distinct
in their focus on organizations and groups that may be involved in racketeering activity,
terrorism, or other threats to national security (Mukasey, 2008).
IV. Literature Review
Empirical terrorism analyses until recently have been somewhat limited, especially
studies concerning the role of human intelligence in terrorism investigations. Nonetheless, a
couple of studies have examined confidential informants and undercover agents. Shields (2012)
and Greenberg (2011) looked at the prevalence of informants and agents, while Hewitt (2014)
studied factors involved in preventing terrorism attacks and apprehending terrorist perpetrators.
Confidential informants and undercover agents have also been referenced in relation to analyses
of successful terrorist attacks and thwarted terrorism plots (Dahl, 2011; Strom, 2010;).
While empirical studies on the use of undercover agents and confidential informants
within the context of terrorism investigations are scarce, Shields’ (2012) study of terrorism
investigations and case outcomes found that the use of confidential informants dropped
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significantly after 9/11. In particular, he found that 58% of court cases used confidential
informants before 9/11, but only 20% of cases did so after 9/11 (2012). In addition, the average
number of confidential informants used per case decreased from 4 informants pre 9/11 to 1.2
informants post 9/11. The average level of assistance provided by confidential informants also
decreased pre to post 9/11 from 2.71 to 2.00 (Shields, 2012)1.
Interestingly, only one out of 25 terrorism investigations examined by Shields (2012)
relied on an undercover agent in the three years following 9/11. Shields (2012) did note,
however, that in cases filed prior to 9/11 there was an average of 2.67 undercover agents used in
cases where at least one undercover agent was used. He also noted that these findings could
significantly change when the remaining post 9/11 cases were coded and analyzed, but his
findings did suggest that there was a significant shift in the pursuit of suspected terrorists by the
government after 9/11.
In another study, Greenberg (2011) provides another look at the use of confidential
informants in terrorism cases. Using all federal court cases that the Department of Justice labels
as terror-related that were inspired by jihadist ideas, this study examined the use of informants
from 2001-2009. Greenberg found that since 9/11, 41% of terrorism cases have involved
confidential informants (2011). Similar to Shields findings, Greenberg (2011) found that from
2002 to 2003, the same time that Attorney General Ashcroft’s guidelines took effect, that there
was a consistent decrease in the use of informants. From 2003 to 2007, however, Greenberg
found the proportion of terrorism cases involving an informant increased from 10% to 70%. That
number decreased to just fewer than 30% from 2007-2008. In 2008, the year following
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The level of assistance provided by confidential informants was measured on a scale from 1-4.
1 = Information only, 2 = Recordings, 3 = Sworn testimony, and 4 = Recordings & sworn
testimony.
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implementation of the Mukasey Guidelines, the percentage increased back up to 70%. Finally,
the 2009-2011 timeframe reveals that the percentage of cases involving informants reverted back
to the 2001 level of 10% of cases.
More recently, Hewitt (2014) examined law-enforcement activities in 20 terrorism cases
since 1968 and 38 cases of terrorism prevention since 9/11. The twenty completed acts of
terrorism all resulted in at least one death. Hewitt (2014) used a seven-fold classification system
of police actions to analyze the most successful tactics in identifying and apprehending
perpetrators in these twenty cases. These factors included: crime scene, witness, routine policing,
informers, surveillance, tips from the public, and rewards. Of the twenty completed terrorism
cases examined by Hewitt (2014), ten were perpetrated by organized groups and ten cases were
perpetrated by unaffiliated individuals, whether lone wolves or members of autonomous cells.
Informants accounted for the second highest total of significant factors in identifying and
apprehending terrorists in organized groups and the fourth highest total in identifying and
apprehending terrorism by unaffiliated individuals (Hewitt, 2014). In total, informers had the
second highest percentage (45%)2 of significant factors in identifying and apprehending terrorists
for both organized and unaffiliated cases.
For the 38 terrorism plots thwarted after 9/11, Hewitt (2014) used a six-fold classification
system of factors involved in the detection of plots. These factors included: routine policing,
rewards, tips from the public, informants, surveillance, and undercover agents. The top two
factors involved in detecting plots were undercover agents and informants, respectively.
Together these two factors equaled 81% of the factors involved in detecting plots (Hewitt, 2014).
2

Since multiple factors influence the successful resolution of each completed terrorism case,
percentages total to more than 100%, for a grand total of 230% (Hewitt, 2014). Since more than
one factor could be involved in detecting plots, the total percent of factors add to more than
100%, for a grand total of 131% (Hewitt, 2014).
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Overall, Hewitt (2014) found that organized terrorist groups were most vulnerable to informers
and surveillance, and that the most successful terrorist preventions involved undercover agents
and informants.
As previous research shows, knowledge about the use of undercover agents and
confidential informants is scarce. While several studies have analyzed the use of confidential
informants in the past, their role in terrorism investigations since 2004 remains unclear.
Additionally, the impact of the Mukasey Guidelines on the use of confidential informants
remains unknown. Regarding undercover agents, very little is known about how they have been
used in federal terrorism investigations since 2004.
Success vs. Prevention
Since 9/11, the intelligence community has strived to refine ways to expose and prevent
domestic terrorist schemes before they occur (Strom, 2010). The aforementioned Attorney
General Guidelines and USA PATRIOT Act were measures taken by the government to assist
the intelligence community in the prevention of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. Since the goal of
using undercover agents and confidential informants is to ultimately prevent terrorism incidents
from occurring, it is important to review what is known about completed and prevented terrorism
cases.
In one study, Strom (2010) study examined 86 prevented and completed terrorist plots
against the U.S. from 1999 to 2009 and determined which activities and kinds of information that
could either lead to or could have led to the discovery of the plot. Results from this study found
that over 80% of thwarted terrorist schemes were uncovered by law enforcement or general
public observations. Nearly one in five schemes were prevented “accidentally” through
investigations of outwardly unassociated crimes, underscoring the need to understand when
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regular crimes might be associated with terrorism (Strom, 2010). Approximately 40% of the
foiled plots were the result of tips from confidential informants and the public. Overall, Strom
found that investigating leads, along with information sharing among agencies, led to the
prevention of the majority of terrorist schemes in his study. All 86 cases contained executed or
planned acts of violence in which the defendants intended to cause casualties or catastrophic
damage to critical infrastructure (Strom, 2010).
In 2011, Dahl examined 176 terrorist plots from 1987-2010 against American targets that
were prevented or otherwise failed. The most significant finding from this study was that human
intelligence collected from informants and tips received from members of the public were the
most successful counterterrorism tools for breaking up domestic plots (Dahl, 2011). Of the 89
domestic cases that were prevented, 66 involved either undercover agents or informants. Dahl
(2011) found that most plots were foiled because officials had precise, tactical-level intelligence,
often from human sources, on the activities of plotters.
Based on the findings of previous research, policy changes resulting from the events of
September 11 may have significantly altered the use of undercover agents and confidential
informants. Shields’ (2012) earlier investigations into the use of undercover agents and
confidential informants in the years following 9/11 showed a decline in the use of human
intelligence. Greenberg’s examination of informant’s post 9/11 revealed similar findings to
Shields’, highlighting a decrease in use of informants right after September 11th. Additionally,
Greenberg found an increase in the use of informants towards the end of the decade after 9/11.
The usefulness of human intelligence was demonstrated in Strom (2010) and Dahl (2011), who
found that a large percentage of prevented terrorism incidents resulted from cases involving
either an undercover agent or confidential informant.
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Nonetheless, there are several shortcomings of prior literature on this topic. First,
previous research is limited to descriptive analyses of the use of undercover agents in terrorism
cases up to 2004 (Shields, 2012) and on confidential informants up to 2011 (Greenberg, 2011).
Additionally, while Hewitt (2014) examined human intelligence in preventing terrorism, there is
a dearth of research on the various types of case outcomes in cases involving human intelligence.
My contributions to this literature on the use of undercover agents and confidential
informants, as well as thwarted terrorism plots, involves expanding the time frame in which
cases involving human intelligence are examined. Additionally, I examine the categories of
terrorism, the intended target type, the convictions rates, length of prison sentences, and amount
of weapons, drugs, and ammunition seized in terrorism cases involving undercover agents and/or
confidential informants. Doing so will significantly advance what is known about terrorism cases
involving human intelligence in the U.S. following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Theoretical Framework
Paul Wilkinson once quipped that, “Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You
can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets
past you.” The American intelligence community has prevented numerous terrorism plots,
however, the attack on September 11th remains the infamous event that failed to be thwarted.
After 9/11, the FBI was criticized for having deficiencies and other weaknesses that prevented it
from seamlessly sharing intelligence across organizational units (Zegart, 2007). While terrorism
scholars have thus far focused mostly on issues of defining terrorism (Boyns & Ballard, 2009),
several studies have applied criminological theory to causes of terrorism (Clark & Newman,
2009), and the criminal justice response to terrorism (Smith & Damphousse, 1998; Shields,
2012). Two related theories that will be used to explain possible changes in the intelligence
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community and government responses to 9/11 are John Hagan’s Structural-Contextual Theory
and Samuel Walker’s net-widening theory.
Structural Contextual Theory
A key premise of structural-contextual theory is that the criminal justice system is
comprised of components that operate autonomously of one another (Hagan, 1989), or as a
“loosely coupled” system. Under normal circumstances components of the justice system
compete for resources and pursue different goals (Shields, 2012). However, Hagan suggested
that when political power is directed towards particular types of crime, the justice system
becomes tightly coupled (Hagan, 1989). The justice system may also direct political power
towards specific types of crime in what Smith & Damphousse refer to as a “proactive political
environment (Smith & Damphousse, 1998, p.71). A proactive political environment is described
as, “contexts where the surrounding political environment has mandated departures from normal
criminal justice operations” (Hagan, 1989, p.130). Thus, the criminal justice system moves from
a reactive to a proactive system “targeting the prosecution of a particular form of crime and
criminal” (Hagan, 1989: 130). Proactive political environments ultimately lead to the process of
net-widening. Both the proactive political environment and net-widening occur after critical and
high-profile events, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing or the September 11th attacks. Samuel
Walker has furthered a net-widening perspective to explain the implementation of “get tough”
laws and other responses to crime. The general idea behind these laws is that getting tougher on
criminals will increase public safety by reducing crime victimization (Walker, 1998). Walker has
argued, however, that get tough responses to crime also “widen the net” on those who might fall
under the authority of the criminal justice system. In other words, get tough policies and
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practices target lower level offenders who would not be arrested and adjudicated under normal
circumstances (Walker, 1998).
Organizational Resistance to Change
As previously discussed, the events of 9/11 brought numerous policy changes to the
American intelligence community, including the Ashcroft Guidelines, USA Patriot Act, and the
Mukasey Guidelines.
Despite these significant policy changes, there are reasons to expect that the FBI might
revert back to proven methods the agency has used before the implementation of the Ashcroft
Guidelines. This process can be explained by what Lipsky (1980) refers to as street-level
bureaucracy, which suggests that street level actors, such as police, are active participants in
policymaking and make choices based on experience and limited resources that may run counter
to agencies’ policy objectives. Likewise, Maynard-Moody (2003) found that street level
bureaucrats routinely engage in activities that “rub against” policies and rules because they
believe them to be ineffective.
The Department of Homeland Security has spent millions of dollars towards developing
intelligence-led policing agencies (Jackson & Brown, 2007). Intelligence-led policing is an
information-organizing process that allows law enforcement agencies to better understand their
crime issues and account for available resources that will aid the decision making process as to
what tactic or strategy will prevent crime, (i.e. terrorism) (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).
Nonetheless, twenty-first-century technology and advanced analysis programs cannot serve as a
substitute for human relationships (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Information collected by law
enforcement through informants, undercover operatives and contacts with general citizens
continue to be significant components in the fight against terrorism (Taylor & Russell, 2012).
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If Lipsky and Maynard-Moody are correct, then we might expect to see SAC’s and FBI
field offices faithfully adhere to the policy changes implemented by the Ashcroft and Mukasey
Guidelines while the justice system is in a state of heightened coupling, but then revert back to
previously tested and proven methods of investigation when the justice system begins to return to
its normal state. In other words, though the AG Guidelines may have initially forced the FBI to
engage in more proactive policing techniques, effectively sidelining the use of human
intelligence, it is also possible that the street-level bureaucrats of the FBI field offices eventually
reverted back to developing human intelligence leads.
Applying Theory to Terrorism
Regarding terrorism, Smith and Damphousse (1998, p.73) suggest, “when a criminal act
is officially designated by the polity as an act of terrorism, that designation sets in motion
proactive law enforcement and prosecutorial techniques.” After a major event like 9/11, there is
increased scrutiny from the media and public policy officials on members of the criminal justice
system (Damphousse & Shields, 2007). Structural contextual theory would suggest that the
events of 9/11 brought the criminal justice system from a group of loosely coupled components
to a tightened group of components. These components may have previously worked
independently of one another, but after 9/11, pressure from the war on terror would force
agencies to work together towards the goal of terrorism prevention.
With regard to terrorism policy after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft changed the way
the FBI handled terrorism investigations. Prior to 9/11, the FBI used confidential informants and
undercover agents to penetrate and take down terrorist groups from the inside. After 9/11,
Ashcroft redirected domestic antiterrorism policy to intercept and disrupt terrorist organizations
before their members could launch attacks (Shields et al, 2009). This resulted in the casting of a
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wider net by law enforcement to arrest terrorists on less serious crimes, such as documentation
and financial fraud, which before 9/11 was less of a priority. The results of this proactive
environment and net-widening were demonstrated with the swiftly implemented policy changes
to the Attorney General Guidelines in 2002. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats often reject
new or modified rules and policies when they believe them to be unsuccessful (Maynard-Moody,
2003). Thus, I expect that FBI agents would abide by the Ashcroft Guidelines when the justice
system is in a tightly coupled state, but then default back to successful tactics and strategies of
preventing terrorism through the use of human intelligence when the justice system becomes
more loosely coupled. Since the Mukasey Guidelines did not change the FBI’s investigative
mandate, but only bolstered investigative powers, it may be expected that the FBI’s use of using
human intelligence to prevent terrorism will increase after the 2008 guidelines implementation.
Following the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which called for
increased emphasis on human intelligence gathering, and continuing with the FBI’s push to
expand the use of confidential informants in 2007 (FBI, 2007), I expect the proportion of
confidential informants to increase in the middle of the decade, despite diminished impact of
tightened coupling as fear decreases and the adoption of the Mukasey guidelines (as they
bolstered the FBI’s investigative power, but did not change its nature).
V. Research Questions
Research Question 1
The way the FBI conducted terrorism investigations was dramatically altered due to
policy changes after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The fear from 9/11 created a tightly coupled
justice system and forced law enforcement personnel to engage in policing activities that
widened the net of potential terrorist suspects. Additionally, changes where made regarding the
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use of one of the FBI’s most successful counterterrorism tools, the use of human intelligence.
This purpose of this study is to examine whether policy changes after 9/11 influenced the FBI’s
use of human intelligence and if so, what effects has that had on terrorism case outcomes.
1. How did the Ashcroft and Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines change the use of
undercover agents and confidential informants?
The Ashcroft Guidelines changed the FBI from a reactive agency to a proactive
agency. Previously, the FBI’s strategy was to penetrate and take down the leaders of terrorist
groups, whereas the 2002 Guidelines shifted the focus to targeting subordinate group members.
The FBI accomplished this new goal by arresting and prosecuting terrorists earlier and more
often to prevent attacks from being planned or attempted (Shields, 2012). In doing so, ostensibly,
the FBI would have less time to infiltrate groups and gain human intelligence. By the time the
2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, fear from 9/11 that caused the early intervention and
arrest mandates should have subsided, and as noted above, new policy initiatives had been put in
place focusing more attention on human intelligence, returning infiltration strategies to pre-9/11
levels. To test whether this is the case using structural contextual theory, I developed the
following hypotheses:
H1= The proportion of cases by year that used undercover agents and/or confidential
informants will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft
Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present).
H2= The average number of undercover agents and/or confidential informants used per
case will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft
Guidelines era (1980-2002) or Mukasey era (2008-present).
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If tightened coupling is not a permanent effect, as suggested by Damphousse and Shields
(2007), and Lipsky is correct in that street-level bureaucrats often choose to revert to proven
methods of police work, then I would expect the proportion of cases involving confidential
informants and undercover agents to increase in the latter half of the Ashcroft guidelines (2006
and 2007). To examine this effect, I will test the following hypothesis:
H3= The proportion of cases using undercover agents and/or confidential informants will
increase in the latter half of Ashcroft Guidelines era (2006-2007).
Given the fear that gripped America following the attacks on 9/11, which would, in
theory, create a proactive political environment, and given the policy shift towards proactive law
enforcement, we would expect the government to have less time to develop human intelligence
in the post-Ashcroft Guideline era. That should negatively impact the proportion of cases using
confidential informants and undercover agents overall. However, as the attacks were perpetrated
by Islamic extremists, we might expect the government to devote more resources to this
particular threat compared to right-wing, environmental, and leftist terrorist groups. Therefore,
the proportion of Islamic extremist cases using confidential informants and undercover agents
should be higher in the post-Ashcroft era than before 9/11 or after implementation of the
Mukasey guidelines. Therefore, I will test the following hypothesis:
H4= The proportion of cases that make use of confidential informants and/or undercover
agents will be higher among Islamic Extremist cases than among non-Islamic Extremist cases
during the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) compared to prior and subsequent eras.
Prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda and associated movements typically attacked American
embassies, warships, and military bases (Bergen et al, 2011). After 9/11, these targets increased
security measures, thus forcing Al-Qaeda to attack “soft” economic and business targets that are
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easier to hit and ever-present (Bergen et al, 2011). By the time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines
came into effect, fear for the security of government and military targets should have subsided
whereas fear for the safety of “soft” targets should have increased. Based on this information, I
developed the following hypothesis:
H5= The proportion of cases involving undercover agents and/or confidential informants
with planned attacks targeting government and military facilities will be lower in the Mukasey
era (2008-present) compared with the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) and the pre-Ashcroft
Guidelines era (1980-2001), while planned attacks against economic and business targets will be
higher in the Mukasey era (2008-present) compared with the Ashcroft Guidelines era (20022007) and the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001).
The Ashcroft Guidelines caused the FBI to aggressively arrest and prosecute terrorists at
a quicker rate than had ever been done. This essentially gave the FBI less time to use undercover
agents and/or confidential informants to infiltrate groups. This also likely allowed for undercover
agents and/or confidential informants to have less time to collect evidence against terrorists due
to quick prosecution demands. By the time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, the
impact of tightened coupling might have subsided and street-level bureaucracy may have altered
the use of proactive policies, giving undercover agents and confidential informants more time to
collect evidence. To test this reasoning, I created the following hypothesis:
H6= The average level of assistance provided by undercover agents and/or confidential
informants will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft
Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present).
The Ashcroft Guidelines mandated that the FBI intervene early and prosecute
aggressively. This mandate gave the FBI less time to infiltrate terrorist groups with human
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intelligence. Moreover, in cases where the FBI had time to infiltrate a group, they likely had less
time to collect evidence and set up stings in order to maximize prosecution chances of a
conviction with numerous charges from defendants being caught with drugs or weapons. By the
time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, the system may have become more loosely
coupled. With loosened time restrictions, undercover agents and confidential informants should
have been able to collect evidence and set up sting operations that maximized the charges
prosecutors could use against defendants who were in possession of illegal drugs and weapons at
the time of arrest. Based on this information, I developed the following hypothesis:
Research Question 2
Assuming the FBI and the criminal justice system followed Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s guidelines to intervene early and prosecute aggressively, cases that used undercover
agents and confidential informants may have been handled differently than cases not involving
human intelligence. To analyze this issue, I created the following research question.
2. What impact, if any, have the changes in use of undercover agents and confidential
informants had on case processing and outcomes?
The FBI’s change from a proactive to a reactive agency affected both the goals and the
abilities of the FBI. Most significant was the early intervention strategy to prevent terrorism. To
accomplish this, law enforcement agents had to arrest terrorists quicker and prosecutors had to
convict terrorists sooner than before the Ashcroft Guidelines were put in place. Quicker arrest
rates are likely to result in less serious crimes prosecuted as criminals will be caught in the early
stages of terroristic activities. The prosecution of less serious crimes should be reflected through
lower count severities. With less serious charges to prove a defendant was guilty beyond a
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reasonable doubt, prosecutors should be able to more easily convict defendants. To examine this,
I created the following hypothesis:
H8= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in higher
conviction rates than cases without undercover agents and/or confidential informants and
conviction rates will be higher in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the preAshcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present).
The Ashcroft Guidelines called for the early arrests and prosecutions of terrorists. To
make this happen, the FBI had to arrest terrorists on less serious crimes, such as documentation
and financial fraud. The prosecution of less serious crimes such as these should result in less
serious sentences. Given the expectation of shorter prison sentences in cases post-Ashcroft
Guidelines, however, the use of undercover agents and confidential informants typically involves
more serious situations where the agent or informer is able to gather evidence against the
defendant(s). Therefore, it is likely that cases involving undercover agents and confidential
informants will feature a greater amount of evidence and will result in longer prison sentences
than cases without human intelligence. Based on this reasoning, I developed the following
hypothesis:
H9= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in longer
prison sentences than cases without undercover agents and/or confidential informants and cases
during the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) will have shorter prison sentences than cases in
the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present).
The ultimate purpose of undercover agents and confidential informants is to aid in the
prevention of terrorism, whether that is through gathering information or collecting evidence.
Since agents and informants put their lives at risk with these duties, and numerous resources
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including time and money are invested towards their efforts, the government would not use
human intelligence if there were not a high chance of being successful. Moreover, undercover
agents and confidential informants are embedded in terrorist groups where they gain knowledge
of future plots, just as any other member would. This knowledge should allow the infiltrator to
alert authorities before any successful plots are attempted. To analyze this reasoning, the
following hypothesis was created:
H10= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in a higher
percentage of prevented incidents than cases without undercover agents and/or confidential
informants.
VI. Methods
Data
This study uses data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which is housed in the
Fulbright College at the University of Arkansas (Smith & Damphousse, 2000; Smith, 2001). The
ATS was created to collect information specifically on American terrorism in order to form a
database that could be empirically tested to enrich criminologists’ and policy makers’
understanding of terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center provided the name of persons indicted under the FBI’s counterterrorism
program dating back to 1980. Using these, and subsequent lists of cases, the ATS is comprised of
federal court cases upon which at least one person was investigated under a terrorism
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and later indicted in federal court. Thus, the
primary source of the American Terrorism Study’s data is federal court documents. Numerous
government funded grant projects have relied on the ATS to examine a variety of terrorism
issues including geospatial and pre-incident indicators of terrorist activities, prosecutorial and
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defense strategies in terrorism trials, and geographic concentrations of violent extremism and
terrorism in the United States. Data from the ATS are housed in an Oracle relational database.
While the ATS currently contains 443 court cases, this study focuses on the 156 cases that have
been infiltrated by undercover agents and/or confidential informants.
Sorting Variables
To conduct the majority of my analyses, I created two sorting variables from which I
separated the data into different temporal samples. The first sorting variable is referred to as
Time Period. Time Period is a categorical variable that separates all ATS cases into three groups.
The first group is composed of persons indicted before the implementation of the Ashcroft
Attorney General Guidelines in 2002. The second group contains persons that resulted in
indictment between 2002 and 2007, or the time period in which the Ashcroft Guidelines were in
effect. The third sample includes cases resulting in indictment between 2008 and 2014, when the
Mukasey Guidelines superseded the Ashcroft guidelines. The second sorting variable I created is
called Ashcroft Time Period. Ashcroft Time Period measures the proportion of cases using
confidential informants and undercover agents throughout the Ashcroft era based on two
samples. The first sample represents the earlier Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2005) and the
second sample represents the later Ashcroft Guidelines era (2006-2007).
Undercover Operative Variables
As a central focus of this study is undercover agents and confidential informants, I have
several variables related to the use of undercover operatives. First, to measure the year a case
involving undercover agents and confidential informants occurred, I used the variable Infiltrated.
Infiltrated is a dichotomous variable that measures whether cases used an undercover agent
and/or a confidential informant. I coded cases that used an undercover agent and/or a
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confidential informant as 1, while all other cases were coded as 0. Second, I measured
undercover agents and confidential informants using the variables Undercover Agent and
Informant, respectively. Undercover Agent is a dichotomous variable that measures whether a
government agent infiltrated the group. Informant is a dichotomous variable that measures
whether the government had a confidential informant who was a member of the group or closely
associated with the group. I coded cases involving an undercover agent as 1, while all other cases
were coded as 0. I also coded cases in which a confidential informant was used as 1, and all other
cases were coded as 0. Third, I used the variables Informant Number and Undercover Number to
measure how many confidential informants and undercover agents were involved in each case,
respectively. Informant Number is a ratio level variable and measures how many confidential
informants the government used. Undercover Number is also a ratio level variable and measures
how many undercover agents the government used. I analyzed only cases in which at least one
confidential informant and/or undercover agent, and values for both variables ranged from 1 to
10. Fourth, in order to measure the average level of assistance provided by undercover agents
and confidential informants, I used the variables Undercover Assistance and Informant
Assistance. Undercover Assistance measures the level of assistance provided by a government
agent. It is an ordinal level variable (provided some information, but no recording or testimony
(1), provided recorded conversations (2), provided sworn testimony (3), provided both sworn
testimony and recorded conversations (4)). Informant Assistance is also an ordinal level variable
and is coded in the same way as Undercover Assistance.
Case Processing and Outcome Variables
I have three variables (Convicted, Prison Sentence, Prevented Incident) that measure how
court cases were processed and what their outcomes were. To measure conviction rates I created
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a dichotomous variable that I called Convicted. In this variable, cases were coded as 1 where a
conviction of any type occurred and all other instances were coded as 0. To measure prison
sentences I created the variable Prison Sentence. Prison Sentence is a ratio level variable that
measures the sentence length in months of prison that a defendant receives. This variable was
recoded to give the death penalty and life sentences numerical values. I ran a frequency
distribution to determine the longest sentence in months of defendants in my sample, which was
2880 months. I then added one month to that sentence for the death penalty value and life
sentence value to give each of those the values of 2881 and 2882, respectively. In order to assess
the prevention of incidents, I used the variable Prevented Incident. Prevented Incident is a
dichotomous variable that measures whether an attack was prevented or not as result of human
intervention. I coded cases that contained no prevented incidents as 0 and cases that contained a
prevented incident as 1.
Other Variables
In relation to my outcome variable Convicted, I have two control variables that were
used. These variables are Count Severity and Prosecution Strategy. Count Severity and
Prosecution Strategy were used to determine the conviction rate in infiltrated cases across the
three Attorney General Guidelines eras. Count Severity is an interval level variable that measures
the severity of every count a defendant is charged with. It is coded as 1-29 on a scale that
increases in severity. Prosecution Strategy is an ordinal level variable that measures the
prosecution strategy used against a defendant. There are three prosecution strategy categories:
conventional criminality, political innuendo and explicit politicality, coded as 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Conventional Criminality involves cases where the defendant is not linked to a
terrorist group or a terrorist act and is charged with conventional criminal charges (Shields,
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2012). Political Innuendo involves cases where the defendant is linked to a terrorist group or
terrorist act and is charged with conventional crimes. The last prosecution strategy, explicit
politicality- involves cases where the defendants motive for committing a crime is questioned
and where the defendant is linked to a terrorist group outright (Shields, 2012).
I also created a variable called Category. This variable measures the category of terrorism
and is a nominal level variable, (Environmental (1), Far-left (2), Far-right (3), Islamic Extremist
(4)).
Finally, I created the variable Intended Target. Intended Target is the primary target that
a group or individual intended to attack but was unsuccessful in doing so. Intended Target is a
nominal level variable, and was recoded into a categorical variable (financial (1), government
(2), military (3), business (4), private property (5), transportation (6), and other (7)).
VII. Results
Analysis and Findings
The findings for this study are presented below and organized by the two research
questions and the ten corresponding hypotheses. Bivariate statistical test (chi-square, ANOVA)
are used to test each hypothesis. Table 1 represents descriptive statistics for the study. Frequency
distributions from Table 1 show that the American Terrorism Study database contains 443 cases
that meet my inclusion criteria. I divided those cases into eras corresponding to the different
Attorney General Guidelines. This resulted in a sample of 397 cases, as it was not known if an
undercover operative was used in 46 cases of the original sample. The Pre-Ashcroft Era
contained 150 cases, the Ashcroft Era contained 172 cases, and the Mukasey Era contained 75
cases. Furthermore, in the sample of 397 Attorney General Guidelines Era cases, 156 cases
(39.3%) contained a confidential informant, an undercover agent, or both. The Pre-Ashcroft era
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comprised the majority of cases infiltrated by operatives (65%) followed by the Ashcroft (24%)
and Mukasey (23%) eras, respectively.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
American Terrorism Study Cases

N (Percent)
443

Attorney General Guidelines Eras

397

Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey

150 (38%)
172 (43%)
75 (19%)
156

Cases Infiltrated By Operatives
Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey
Cases with Informants
Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey
Cases with Undercover Agents
Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey
Ashcroft Era Divided
2002-2005
2006-2007
Category of Terrorism in Infiltrated Cases
Environmental
Far-Left
Far-Right
Islamic

97 (65%)
41 (24%)
17 (23%)

127
79 (62%)
36 (28%)
12 (9%)
54
38 (70%)
6 (11%)
10 (18%)
172
144 (84%)
28 (16%)
88
29 (33%)
1 (1%)
33 (38%)
25 (28%)
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Variables (Continued)
Intended Targets in Infiltrated Cases
Government
Military
Business
Private Property
Transportation
Other
Conviction Rate: Infiltrated vs. Non-Infiltrated Cases
Non-Infiltrated Cases
Infiltrated Cases
Prison Sentence in Months: Infiltrated vs. Non-Infiltrated
Cases
Non-Infiltrated Cases
Infiltrated Cases

N (Percent)
96
42 (44%)
5 (5%)
16 (17%)
4 (4%)
9 (9%)
20 (21%)
840 Indictees
349 (87%)
491 (76%)
364

222 (73 months)
142 (336 months)

Research Question 1
How did the Ashcroft & Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines change the use of
undercover agents and confidential informants?
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis one tested for differences in the use of undercover operatives throughout
different time periods. Specifically, I hypothesized that the proportion of cases that used
undercover agents and/or confidential informants would be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era
(2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or the Mukasey era (20082014). Findings from testing this hypothesis are presented in Table 2, and partially support my
hypothesis. Results indicate that the proportion of cases with undercover operatives was
significantly lower in the Ashcroft era than the pre-Ashcroft era, however, the proportion of
cases with undercover operatives in the Ashcroft era was nearly identical to the proportion of
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cases with undercover operatives in the Mukasey era. The pre-Ashcroft era had 64.7% of cases
containing operatives that dramatically decreased to 23.7% of cases in the Ashcroft era (p <.05)
and then remained stable at 22.7% of cases in the Mukasey era (p <.05).
Table 2: Crosstabulation of AGG Eras in Infiltrated Cases
Era
No Operative
Operative Used
Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey

53
131
58

97
41
17

% Of Cases with
Operative
64.7 %
23.8 %
22.7 %

Chi-Square = 66.54 Df = 2 p < .05

Hypothesis 2
Table 3 represents ANOVA results comparing the average number of confidential
informants and undercover agents used in cases throughout the pre-Ashcroft, Ashcroft and
Mukasey eras. I hypothesized that the average number of undercover operatives would be the
lowest in the Ashcroft Guidelines era. Counter to my hypothesis, the average number of
informants was the highest during the Ashcroft era. The average number of undercover agents
during the Ashcroft era was in-between the other two eras. The findings did not support my
hypothesis, but the findings were statistically significant.
Table 3: ANOVA of Avg # of Informants and Undercover Agents Per Case
Era
N
Mean
Sig.
Df
Pre-Ashcroft 79
2.02
.000
2
Informant
Ashcroft
36
4.05
Mukasey
12
1.08
Undercover

Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey

38
6
10

1.94
1.16
1.00

.010

2
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Hypothesis 3
In hypothesis three I examined the Ashcroft era in depth by dividing it into two time
periods, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007. I hypothesized that the latter half of the Ashcroft Guidelines
era would feature a greater proportion of cases that used undercover operatives. Results
supported the hypothesis and were statistically significant. I found that the proportion of cases
using operatives dramatically increased from 16% during the 2002-2005 time frame to 64%
during the 2006-2007 time frame.
Table 4: Crosstabulation of Ashcroft Era Divided in Infiltrated Cases
Era
No Operative
Operative Used
% Of Cases with
Operative
2002-2005
121
23
16 %
2006-2007
10
18
64 %
Chi-Square = 30.319 Df = 1 p < .05

Hypothesis 4
Table 5 represents crosstabulation results examining different categories of terrorism and
levels of case infiltration. I hypothesized that Islamic Extremist cases would have the highest
proportion of cases involving undercover operatives compared to cases in other categories of
terrorism. The findings did not support hypothesis four. Statistically, Far-Left terrorism
contained the highest proportion of cases that used undercover operatives, at 100%, however,
there was only one Far-Left terrorism case in the sample. Islamic Extremist cases contained a
nearly identical proportion of cases using undercover operatives as Far-Right cases at 24.0% and
24.2%, respectively. Notably, 62% of Environmental cases made use of undercover operatives.
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Table 5: Crosstabulation of Category of Terrorism in Infiltrated Cases
Category
No Operative
Operative Used
% Of Cases with
Operative
Environmental
11
18
62 %
Far-Left
0
1
100 %
Far-Right
25
8
24.0 %
Islamic Extremist
19
6
24.2 %
Chi-Square = 13.554 Df = 3 p < .05

Hypothesis 5
In hypothesis five, I examined the intended target type in infiltrated cases across the three
Attorney General Guidelines Eras. I hypothesized that the proportion of cases involving
undercover operatives (both confidential informants and undercover agents) with the planned
attacks targeting government and military facilities would be the lowest during the Mukasey era,
while planned attacks against economic and business targets would be the highest during the
Mukasey era. The results did not support the hypothesis. The Mukasey era did have the lowest
proportion of infiltrated cases with the intended target being government or military facilities as
well as the highest proportion of cases with business targets; however, the findings were not
statistically significant at the .05 level.
Table 6: Crosstabulation of Intended Targets in Infiltrated Cases
Era
Government
Military
Pre-Ashcroft
46 %
5%
Ashcroft
33 %
8%
Mukasey
28 %
0%

Business
15 %
16 %
28 %

Chi-Square = 9.069 Df = 10 Sig. = NS

Hypothesis 6
Table 7 represents ANOVA results comparing the average level of assistance provided by
undercover agents across the three Attorney General Guidelines Eras. In addition, I performed a
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second ANOVA to measure the level of assistance provided by confidential informants. I
hypothesized that the average level of assistance provided by either undercover agents or
confidential informants would be the lowest during the Ashcroft Guidelines. The findings
partially supported the hypothesis. I found that informants provided the highest level of
assistance during the Ashcroft era and that this result was non-significant. In support of the
hypothesis, I found that undercover agents had the lowest level of assistance during the Ashcroft
era and that this was statistically significant.

Table 7: ANOVA of Informant and Undercover Assistance
Era
N
Mean
Pre-Ashcroft 74
2.39
Informant
Ashcroft
36
2.55
Mukasey
9
2.11
Undercover

Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft
Mukasey

38
5
7

3.52
2.40
2.57

Sig.
.520

Df
2

.012

2

Research Question 2
What impact, if any, have the changes in use of undercover agents and confidential
informants had on case processing and outcomes?
Hypothesis 8
I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in higher conviction
rates than cases without undercover operatives and that conviction rates among the three
Attorney General Guidelines eras would be highest in the Ashcroft era. I first used an
independent samples t-test to find the conviction rate percentage in both types of cases (See
Table 8a). The t-test results did not support the hypothesis and showed that the conviction rate in
cases with undercover operatives was 75%, whereas the conviction rate in cases without
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undercover operatives was 86% (p < .05). Next, I ran a one-way ANOVA test to compare the
conviction rate in infiltrated cases across the three Attorney General Guidelines eras (See Table
8b). The ANOVA results, however, were not statistically significant between Attorney General
Guidelines eras (p >.05). I then ran logistic regression controlling for count severity and
prosecution strategy to measure the significance of undercover operatives on conviction rates
(See Table 8c). The Hosmer/Lemeshow Chi-Square indicated that there were no fitness
problems, but the percentage of explained variance did not increase beyond the initial model.
Count severity was not significant when controlling for prosecution strategy and infiltration, and
infiltration was not significant when controlling for count severity and prosecution strategy,
though it was very close (.059) with a negative impact on the likelihood of conviction. The only
significant variable was prosecution strategy; consistent with prior research, the more politicized
the case became the greater the log odds that there would not be a conviction. The Nagelkerke
value shows that only 6.5% of the variation in conviction outcomes in my model can be
explained by count severity, prosecution strategy and infiltration.
Table 8a: Independent Samples T-Test of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
349
.86
.338
No Operative
491
.75
.430
Operative Used
t = 4.073 Df = 838 p < .05
Table 8b: ANOVA of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases
Era
N
Mean
Sig.
Pre-Ashcroft
168
.78
.070
Ashcroft
19
.63
Mukasey
10
1.00

Df
2
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Table 8c: Logistic Regression of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases
B
Df
Sig.
-.004
1
.620
Count Severity
2
.001
Conventional
-.681
1
.018
Innuendo
-1.009
1
.000
Explicit
-.406
1
.059
Infiltrate
Nagelkerke = .065
Hosmer/Lemeshow Chi-Square = 9.656, Df = 8, p > .05

Exp(B)
.996
.506
.364
.666

Hypothesis 9
Table 9a represents independent samples t-test results of the average prison sentence
length in months in cases with undercover operatives compared to cases without undercover
operatives. I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in longer prison
sentences than cases without undercover operatives (See Table 9a). The results support the
hypothesis and are statistically significant, but I report these findings with a caveat. In order to
properly measure sentence lengths, prior research indicates that I should control for overall case
severity and prior criminal history. Ideally, I would have done so, but very few cases in the post9/11 are available for these variables. I found that cases with undercover operatives have an
average prison sentence of 336 months whereas cases that do not use undercover operatives have
an average prison sentence of 73 months. Additionally, I ran a one-way ANOVA test to compare
the prison sentence lengths in infiltrated cases across the three Attorney General Guidelines eras
(See Table 9b). I hypothesized that cases during the Ashcroft era would have the shortest prison
sentences among the three eras. The ANOVA results were statistically significant between
Attorney General Guidelines eras with defendants in the Ashcroft era having the lowest average
prison sentence length in months with an average of 72 months (p <.05).
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Table 9a: Independent Samples T-Test of Prison Sentences in Infiltrated Cases
N
Mean
302
73
Cases No Operative
433
336
Cases With Operative
t = -3.844 Df = 733 p < .05

Table 9b: ANOVA of Prison Sentences in Infiltrated Cases
Era
N
Mean
Sig.
Pre-Ashcroft
464
265
.000
Ashcroft
265
72
Mukasey
90
115

Df
2

Hypothesis 10
In hypothesis ten, I examined prevented incidents in both cases with and without
undercover operatives. I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in a
higher percentage of prevented incidents than cases without undercover operatives. The findings
support the hypothesis and were statistically significant (See Table 10). I found that 23% of cases
without undercover operatives contained a prevented incident whereas 27% of cases with
undercover operatives contained a prevented incident.
Table 10: Crosstabulation of Prevented Incidents and Infiltrated Cases
Prevented Incidents
% of Cases Prevented
No Operative
56
23 %
Operative Used
43
27 %
Chi-Square = 44.626 Df = 2 p < .05

VIII. Discussion
The events of 9/11 were the stimulus needed to change America’s counterterrorism
efforts. As a response to that infamous day, some of the major changes the U.S. government
made were policy related, most significantly the Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines. The
FBI’s investigative scope was expanded through the Ashcroft Guidelines, ultimately changing
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the mission of the FBI from a reactive to a proactive agency and making counterterrorism its top
priority. The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship of policy changes on the use of
undercover operatives. Specifically, this study sought to determine whether the Attorney General
Guidelines that were implemented after 9/11 changed the use of undercover agents and
confidential informants in federal terrorism cases. Additionally, this study had the goal of
examining what impact, if any, the changes in use of undercover operatives had on case
processing and outcomes. The results of my analyses were mixed in providing support for my
hypotheses.
Research Question 1
My first research question was designed to explore the influence of the 2002 and 2008
Attorney General Guidelines in terrorism cases that used undercover agents and confidential
informants. I predicted that the Ashcroft Guidelines era would have the lowest proportion of
cases that used undercover operatives compared to the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era and the
Mukasey era. I found a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of cases that used
undercover operatives from the pre-Ashcroft era to the Ashcroft era (64% to 23%). However, the
Ashcroft era contained a slightly higher proportion of cases that used undercover operatives than
the Mukasey era (23% to 22%). These findings suggest that the FBI’s counterterrorism goals via
the Ashcroft Guidelines to arrest and prosecute terrorists earlier and more often were successful.
These results do not suggest, however, that by the time the Mukasey Guidelines came into effect,
fear, driven by the 9/11 attacks that caused the early intervention and arrest mandates, had
subsided returning infiltration strategies and levels to what they were pre 9/11. While the justice
system may still be in a state of tightened coupling causing a low proportion of Mukasey era
cases to contain undercover operatives, the findings may be reflective of an absence of cases that
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await coding in the American Terrorism Study database. I ran a frequency distribution of the
number of infiltrated cases by year. There were 9 infiltrated cases in 2010 and 6 infiltrated cases
in 2011. These high numbers of infiltrated cases suggest that the Mukasey era may actually
contain a higher proportion of cases that used undercover operatives than the Ashcroft era as
there are numerous cases from the last five years still being coded and entered into the ATS
database.
Regarding the average number of undercover agents and confidential informants used per
case, I hypothesized that the Ashcroft era would have the lowest average number of undercover
operatives used among the three eras. The results indicated cases in the Aschroft era had neither
the lowest average number of informants nor agents. In fact, Aschroft era cases had the highest
number of confidential informants as compared to the Mukasey era. After closer examination of
the cases during this time period, I found 14 related cases where informants were used in 2006,
and each of those cases featured eight confidential informants—the same informants. These 14
cases are collectively known as the “ELF Family,” and involved numerous defendants in
multiple cases, some of whom turned states evidence and testified against their fellow Earth
Liberation Front (ELF) members to mitigate their sentences. Thus, the ELF Family case study
likely skews the number of informants per case, which makes the analysis of undercover agents a
more accurate depiction of the average number of operatives used during the guidelines.
Nonetheless, the Ashcroft era contained an average of 1.16 agents whereas the Mukasey era
contained an average of 1.00 agents indicating a minimal change between time periods, at least
among those cases currently coded. While the Ashcroft era did not contain the lowest average
number of undercover agents, it was significantly less than the average number of agents used in
the Pre-Ashcroft era (1.16 to 1.94 agents). This decrease from nearly 2 agents to 1 agent per case
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is likely the result of early arrest and prosecution strategies brought on by the justice system
being tightly coupled.
Turning to the category of terrorism, I hypothesized that Islamic Extremist cases would
have the highest proportion of cases with undercover operatives compared to other categories of
terrorism during the Ashcroft era. Not counting the Far-Left typology, as there was only one
valid case, Environmental cases had the highest proportion, at 62%, whereas Far-Right and
Islamic Extremist cases were proportionate to one another at 24.2% and 24.0%, respectively. It
could be argued that the ELF Family cases skew results for this hypothesis as well. However,
even by excluding the 14 ELF Family cases, the proportion of Environmental cases that used
undercover operatives is still the highest at 26.6%. A possible explanation for why
Environmental terrorism had the highest proportion of cases involving undercover operatives
may be a reflection of the organizational structure and tactics of the Earth Liberation Front. ELF
operates under a leaderless resistance model and the Ashcroft Guidelines changed the FBI’s
tactics from targeting group leaders prior to 9/11 to targeting subordinate group members after
9/11(Joosse, 2007). With little to no established groups and/or group members to maintain
loyalty to, it is likely easier for defendant’s to turn states evidence on any other environmental
terrorists they may know to receive a better sentence in court. Likewise, it is likely also easier for
the FBI to establish informants to single individuals to gain their trust rather than attempting to
gain the trust of an entire terrorist group. Thus, the FBI’s post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy
directly aligned with how environmental terrorists operated. Structural contextual theory would
suggest that the FBI would have established undercover operatives in a greater proportion of
Islamic extremist cases due to the involvement of Islamic extremists in the 9/11 attacks.
However, the Ashcroft Guidelines demand for early intervention in terrorism cases aligned with
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the tactics of environmental terrorists more so than Islamic extremists, represented by the higher
proportion of environmental terrorism cases.
Concerning the intended target type in infiltrated cases, I hypothesized that the Mukasey
era would have the lowest proportion of infiltrated cases that featured government and military
facility targets, and that the Mukasey era cases would have the highest proportion of business
targets. While there were no statistically significant differences between the three eras (sig. =
.526) regarding actual targets, the Mukasey era did have the lowest proportion of infiltrated cases
where the target in the case was a government or military facility. The Mukasey era cases also
contained the highest proportion of cases where the target in the case was a business target.
These findings, while not significant, coincide with prior literature on terrorist group tactics post
9/11. As Bergen et al (2011) found, terrorists have shifted from attacking hard targets such as
American embassies, warships, and military bases, which are better defended after 9/11, to
attacking soft targets such as economic and business organizations. While structural contextual
theory does not explain terrorist behaviors, it may suggest why terrorist tactics have changed
after 9/11. The fear from 9/11, with the Pentagon being attacked and potentially the nation’s
capitol being targeted, left the justice system believing that it was only a matter of time before
the next government or military facility was attacked. Thus, when the justice system was tightly
coupled, it worked together to increase security on both government and military facilities while
security measures for economic and business organizations remain relatively unchanged.
When I examined the average level of assistance provided by confidential informants and
undercover agents, I hypothesized that the Ashcroft era would have the lowest level of assistance
for both types of undercover operatives. Regarding informants, there was no statistical difference
between eras. Undercover agents, however, did provide the lowest average level of assistance
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during the Ashcroft era, supporting my hypothesis, and providing evidence of structural
contextual theory in effect after 9/11. This finding represents another example of how fear from
the 9/11 attacks caused the criminal justice system to become tightly coupled. Undercover agents
provided less assistance during the Ashcroft era, which represented a change in FBI
investigations which stemming from the Ashcroft Guidelines demanding arrests earlier and more
often, thus giving undercover agents less time to collect evidence.
Research Question 2
My second research question was created to measure what impact, if any, the changes in
the use of undercover operatives had on case processing and outcomes. Looking at conviction
rates, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would have higher conviction rates
than cases without operatives, and that the Ashcroft Guidelines era would have the highest rate
of convictions among the three eras. None of my findings supported this hypothesis. Conviction
rates were 11% higher in cases that did not use undercover operatives. Furthermore, results were
not significant (p >.05) concerning the conviction rates between Attorney General Guidelines
eras. Additionally, when I examined conviction rates controlling for count severity and
prosecution strategy I found that undercover operatives were not a significant factor. As
previously stated, these findings are consistent with previous research in that the prosecution
strategy is the most significant factor in determining conviction rates. Logically, as Shields
(2012) suggests, if prosecutors have more evidence, in this case, via confidential informants and
undercover agents, they may be more likely to pursue more politicized charges. This would
explain the negative relationship I found between level of assistance provided and conviction
rates. While the “early and often” arrest and prosecution strategies were brought on by the justice
system being in a state of tightened coupling from fear from 9/11, it appears that quicker and
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more frequent arrests and prosecutions did not significantly impact conviction rates, at least not
in my sample of infiltrated cases. Thus, while the justice system being in a state of tightened
coupling did not influence conviction rates in infiltrated cases, as prior research suggests,
tightened coupling was in effect as the overall amount of plea rates and conviction rates
increased after 9/11.
Turning to prison sentence lengths, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives
would have longer prison sentences than cases without operatives and that among the three
Attorney General Guidelines eras the Ashcroft era would have the shortest prison sentences. As
mentioned in my findings section, I would have preferred to run a multivariate analysis
controlling for count severity and prior criminal history, but the data are not available for those
two variables after 9/11, due in large part to changes in the way courts prepare and report
judgments. With this limitation in mind, the first part of my hypothesis was supported. Cases
with undercover operatives had a statistically significant greater prison sentence lengths than
cases without operatives (336 months compared to 73 months, p <.05). This finding supports the
notion that undercover operations involve more serious situations in which the undercover agent
or informant is able to gather a greater amount of evidence to use against the defendant,
ultimately resulting in a longer prison sentence. While this finding was significant, it does come
with the caveat of needing to be tested with multivariate analysis. The ATS database contains a
large proportion of cases that do not involve intended or actual targets. Instead, these cases
involve individuals who have been prosecuted for what are referred to as ‘paper crimes’, or
crimes involving immigration violations and financial fraud. These paper crime cases contain
less severe charges that result in shorter prison sentences. Cases such as these indicate the
necessity to measure overall case severity and to run further statistical analyses.
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My last finding regarding prison sentences showed that the difference in prison sentence
lengths between eras was significant with the Ashcroft Era containing the shortest average prison
sentence length in months. Thus, it appears that structural contextual theory and the net-widening
theory are helpful in predicting prison sentence lengths. Of course while my models derived
from these theories are statistically significant, the theories themselves may indirectly influence
statistical findings through the type of cases that are brought through the justice system. If the
criminal justice system is in a state of tightened coupling with a wider net casted on crimes being
investigated, then cases with undercover operatives will only continue to have greater prison
sentence lengths than cases without operatives.
My last hypothesis analyzed case outcomes in terms of whether an incident was
prevented in that case. Specifically, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would
result in a higher percentage of prevented incidents than cases without undercover operatives.
The results were statistically significant and supported my hypothesis. There was a greater
percentage of prevented incidents in cases with undercover operatives (27.6%) than there were in
cases without operatives (23%). As presented, this finding shows that the time and resources put
into undercover operations are successful in the FBI’s highest priority of countering terrorism.
However, this may not be the entire story. When coding prevented incidents, I used a
conservative measure that only included cases that had no actual targets. The sample of
prevented incidents was comprised of cases that only had intended targets that were never
physically attacked, as apposed to cases that contained both intended targets and actual targets.
By including cases with both intended and actual targets (mixed cases), the difference may be
greater than my results indicate because mixed cases mask the true number of prevented attacks.
Nonetheless, cases with undercover operatives result in a higher percentage of prevented
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incidents than cases without operatives. This finding, along with my previous findings that
prison sentences in cases with operatives are longer than prison sentences in cases without
operatives, suggests that undercover operations are not only more successful in preventing
terrorism incidents, but they are more successful in putting defendants behind bars for a longer
period of time.
IX. Conclusion & Future Research
The purpose of this study was to add to the limited body of empirical research that has
been conducted on undercover operatives in federal terrorism cases. This study contributed to
prior literature by focusing on the impact of policy changes on the use of undercover operatives.
Specifically, the 2002 Ashcroft and 2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines served as a
defining line between when undercover operatives were used and how policy changes influenced
undercover operations throughout different temporal periods.
Future research on undercover agents and confidential informants in federal terrorism
cases has numerous possible avenues to explore. Expanding this study’s findings, the addition of
more cases into the ATS database would allow for more advanced statistical analyses into
examining prison sentence lengths among infiltrated and non-infiltrated cases. Additionally,
adding cases to the ATS database would allow greater insight into the Mukasey era and its
influence on undercover operatives as the most recent year with infiltrated cases in the database
is 2011. Another avenue for future research would be to examine the length of investigations in
cases with undercover operatives versus cases without undercover operatives. By analyzing how
long the government takes from the first day of the investigation to the day of arrest, the FBI
may be able to better allocate time and resources in a more appropriate manner by balancing
budget and safety issues.
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